As I reported
previously, on Wednesday Indonesia destroyed a Chinese vessel caught
fishing illegally in Indonesian waters near the South China Sea, the
first since President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo declared war on illegal
fishing when he came into office late last year (See: “Indonesia Sinks First Chinese Vessel Under Jokowi”).
How might we expect Beijing to react?
So far, the only publicly-confirmed reaction from China has come from
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei, who said that Beijing was
concerned about the reports and was seeking clarification with Jakarta.
“China is gravely concerned about relevant reports, and is asking the
Indonesian side to make clarifications,” foreign ministry spokesman
Hong Lei reportedly said.
“We hope that the Indonesian side can press ahead with fishery
cooperation in a constructive manner and safeguard the legitimate rights
and interests of Chinese companies.”
What might China do beyond this?
Though there is always a risk of incidents like these eventually
spiraling out of control, the most likely scenario is that Beijing will
register its concerns and both sides will work the issue out
diplomatically. It is unlikely to significantly damage the overall
bilateral relationship. Incidents of this sort have tended to be
resolved in this way even if they seem like flashpoints at the time.
For example, when, on June 20, 2009, eight boats containing 75
Chinese fishermen were seized for infringing on Indonesia’s exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, an agreement was eventually
worked out between the two sides which saw the release of most of the
fishermen. That case is particularly relevant today since Indonesian
media reports suggest that the Chinese vessel sunk on Wednesday was one
of those seized in the 2009 incident. While Beijing is admittedly
dealing with a government in Jakarta now that is far pricklier when it
comes to sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is also true that the
stakes are lower in this case. The issue at hand is the sinking of an
empty vessel rather than the welfare of fishermen.
Furthermore, as I have written before, both sides attach great
importance to the Sino-Indonesian relationship. Ties have blossomed over
the past decade, with trade quadrupling to $66 billion and investment
increasing to $2 billion as both countries went from strategic partners
in 2005 to comprehensive strategic partners in 2013. People-to-people
relations have also expanded appreciably, while military ties have
advanced, albeit at a more cautious level.
Under Jokowi, the two sides have been looking at ways to further
solidify cooperation, and Indonesia’s enthusiasm for the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and ongoing conversations about
how Jokowi’s global maritime fulcrum doctrine can potentially complement
Beijing’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road idea suggest that there is at
least some promise there (See: “China and Indonesia Under Jokowi: Show Me The Money”).
Of course, as I have consistently pointed out, there is still lingering
distrust towards China in Indonesia and outstanding concerns in several
areas, including Beijing’s nine-dashed line which encroaches into the
waters surrounding Jakarta’s resource-rich Natuna Islands (See: “No, Indonesia’s South China Sea Policy Has Not Changed”).
The point is that the relationship is important enough for both sides
cautious about letting irritants get in the way of advancing ties even
further.
In addition, as I noted in my earlier piece, Indonesia has
demonstrated great caution in the way it has gone about the sinking of
this first Chinese vessel. As opposed to other Asian states whose
vessels were sunk with immediate effect, Indonesia’s stance towards
China evolved more gradually. The seizure of several boats in December
led the government to revoke a deal signed with Beijing on cooperation
in the fisheries sector in early 2015 before the first actual sinking
was carried out this week. The Chinese vessel was also destroyed along
with 41 vessels from other neighboring states, rather than alone or in
much smaller numbers as has been the case with other countries. In
addition, Indonesia’s Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi
Pudjiastuti, was careful to emphasize that the sinkings were not a show
of force, but merely a case of Indonesia enforcing its laws.
The more interesting and difficult question is how this might affect
unrealized cooperation going forward, rather than cooperation that is
already ongoing. This is particularly true in the maritime domain,
including in fisheries which Hong referred to. That will be contingent
on a number of other critical factors, including whether the sinking of
the Chinese vessel represents the beginning of a stricter Indonesian
line that we will see applied periodically moving forward, as it has
been with other countries.
--- Prashanth Parameswaran is Associate Editor at The Diplomat based
in Washington, D.C., where he writes mostly on Southeast Asia, Asian
security affairs and U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. He is also
a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University.
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