As I reported 
previously, on Wednesday Indonesia destroyed a Chinese vessel caught 
fishing illegally in Indonesian waters near the South China Sea, the 
first since President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo declared war on illegal 
fishing when he came into office late last year (See: “Indonesia Sinks First Chinese Vessel Under Jokowi”).
How might we expect Beijing to react?
So far, the only publicly-confirmed reaction from China has come from
 Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei, who said that Beijing was 
concerned about the reports and was seeking clarification with Jakarta.
“China is gravely concerned about relevant reports, and is asking the
 Indonesian side to make clarifications,” foreign ministry spokesman 
Hong Lei reportedly said.
“We hope that the Indonesian side can press ahead with fishery 
cooperation in a constructive manner and safeguard the legitimate rights
 and interests of Chinese companies.”
What might China do beyond this?
Though there is always a risk of incidents like these eventually 
spiraling out of control, the most likely scenario is that Beijing will 
register its concerns and both sides will work the issue out 
diplomatically. It is unlikely to significantly damage the overall 
bilateral relationship. Incidents of this sort have tended to be 
resolved in this way even if they seem like flashpoints at the time.
For example, when, on June 20, 2009, eight boats containing 75 
Chinese fishermen were seized for infringing on Indonesia’s exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, an agreement was eventually 
worked out between the two sides which saw the release of most of the 
fishermen. That case is particularly relevant today since Indonesian 
media reports suggest that the Chinese vessel sunk on Wednesday was one 
of those seized in the 2009 incident. While Beijing is admittedly 
dealing with a government in Jakarta now that is far pricklier when it 
comes to sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is also true that the
 stakes are lower in this case. The issue at hand is the sinking of an 
empty vessel rather than the welfare of fishermen.
Furthermore, as I have written before, both sides attach great 
importance to the Sino-Indonesian relationship. Ties have blossomed over
 the past decade, with trade quadrupling to $66 billion and investment 
increasing to $2 billion as both countries went from strategic partners 
in 2005 to comprehensive strategic partners in 2013. People-to-people 
relations have also expanded appreciably, while military ties have 
advanced, albeit at a more cautious level.
Under Jokowi, the two sides have been looking at ways to further 
solidify cooperation, and Indonesia’s enthusiasm for the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and ongoing conversations about 
how Jokowi’s global maritime fulcrum doctrine can potentially complement
 Beijing’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road idea suggest that there is at
 least some promise there (See: “China and Indonesia Under Jokowi: Show Me The Money”). 
 Of course, as I have consistently pointed out, there is still lingering
 distrust towards China in Indonesia and outstanding concerns in several
 areas, including Beijing’s nine-dashed line which encroaches into the 
waters surrounding Jakarta’s resource-rich Natuna Islands (See: “No, Indonesia’s South China Sea Policy Has Not Changed”).
 The point is that the relationship is important enough for both sides 
cautious about letting irritants get in the way of advancing ties even 
further.
In addition, as I noted in my earlier piece, Indonesia has 
demonstrated great caution in the way it has gone about the sinking of 
this first Chinese vessel. As opposed to other Asian states whose 
vessels were sunk with immediate effect, Indonesia’s stance towards 
China evolved more gradually. The seizure of several boats in December 
led the government to revoke a deal signed with Beijing on cooperation 
in the fisheries sector in early 2015 before the first actual sinking 
was carried out this week. The Chinese vessel was also destroyed along 
with 41 vessels from other neighboring states, rather than alone or in 
much smaller numbers as has been the case with other countries. In 
addition, Indonesia’s Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi 
Pudjiastuti, was careful to emphasize that the sinkings were not a show 
of force, but merely a case of Indonesia enforcing its laws.
The more interesting and difficult question is how this might affect 
unrealized cooperation going forward, rather than cooperation that is 
already ongoing. This is particularly true in the maritime domain, 
including in fisheries which Hong referred to. That will be contingent 
on a number of other critical factors, including whether the sinking of 
the Chinese vessel represents the beginning of a stricter Indonesian 
line that we will see applied periodically moving forward, as it has 
been with other countries.
--- Prashanth Parameswaran is Associate Editor at The Diplomat based 
in Washington, D.C., where he writes mostly on Southeast Asia, Asian 
security affairs and U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. He is also
 a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 
University.

 
 
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