A third incident
involving the arrest of a Chinese fisherman by Indonesian authorities
operating near Natuna Island – this time leading to an injury of one
Chinese fisherman – has ratcheted up tensions between Beijing and
Jakarta. The June incident featured the second recent incident – the other one occurring in May
— of the Indonesian Navy opening fire to force Chinese fishing vessels
to comply with Indonesian demands to cease operations and allow
Indonesian authorities to detain the vessel.
This is of course not the first time the Indonesian Navy has been
involved in use of force against foreign fishing vessels operating in
Indonesian exclusive economic zone waters. On September 19, 2005, the
Indonesian Navy pursued and arrested the Chinese fishing vessel “Fu Yuan
Yu 132” that was illegally fishing off Papua Province. During the operation,
the naval vessel opened fired against the fishing boat, killing one and
injuring two Chinese crew members. Just a few months ago, the
Indonesian navy opened fire on Taiwanese fishing vessels operating in the Strait of Malacca in Indonesia’s EEZ.
Yet the June incident is notable because it marked the second
instance of the Indonesian Navy taking the lead in patrolling the Natuna
EEZ to combat increasing incursions by Chinese fisherman – an area that had previously been patrolled primarily by Indonesian maritime law enforcement vessels.
The recent deployment of Indonesia’s Navy to Natuna appeared to
replace, to some extent, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
(MMAF) vessels that had been protecting Natuna waters from foreign
fishing violations, in particular after a Chinese coast guard vessel provocatively rammed and forced free a Chinese fishing boat
that was being towed back to Natuna under the protection of the MMAF in
March 2016. Soon after that incident, the Indonesian Navy was tabbed by
Indonesian policymakers to patrol Natuna, presumably as a more forceful
deterrent against the Chinese.
In contrast to the March incident, in the May incident – the first
major confrontation between the Indonesian navy and Chinese fishing
vessels near Natuna in several years – the Chinese coast guard on the
scene appeared not to interfere with the operation of the Indonesian Navy as it arrested a Chinese fishing trawler and later towed it back to Natuna.
China’s cautious approach prompted an Indonesian naval spokesperson to draw the following comparison between the March and May incidents:
[A]t the time, the pursuit [of the fishing vessels] involved a tiny patrol boat belonging to the KKP [the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries]. But this time [the Chinese coastguard vessel] did not dare to interrupt because the chase involved a frigate.
This statement gives voice to a perception among some policymakers in
Southeast Asia that Navies are more effective deterrents than coast
guards in combating illegal maritime activity. It also highlights an
important and under-analyzed tension in the region over whether navies
or coast guards offer more appropriate platforms for carrying out
policing functions at sea, especially as it relates to countering the
aggressive behavior of China’s fisherman and coast guard.
Until recently, the notion that states in Southeast Asia should
employ coast guards as opposed to navies to manage, regulate, and
enforce domestic and international maritime laws and conventions had
been gaining currency. Coast guards, for one, present a less escalatory
face of state power than navies. Their status as a civilian maritime
law enforcement agency signals an intent on the part of the state to
enforce activities that may impact the maritime environment, safety, and
protection of marine resources of a coastal state. Finally, coast
guards offer a wider array of non-lethal means of enforcement that
dampen the potential for inadvertent escalation to war in disputed
territory, in particular in the South China Sea.
The trend toward greater utilization of coast guards a front line
defenders of maritime rights and interests has been on display not only
in Indonesia, but also in the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam over the last five years.
The coast guard fleets of most countries in Southeast Asia, however,
lack sufficient capacity to adequately deal with the formidable
maritime threats along their coast and in disputed waters in the South
China Sea. Navies are often viewed as the preferred asset for far seas
enforcement because of their capacity to operate at long range from
shore facilities. Also, most naval officials in the region strongly
promote the view that navies offer a more effective deterrent than their
civilian maritime law enforcement counterparts. Navies, like all
bureaucratic actors, after all, seek relevance and funding, and thus
most seek status as the vanguard of a nation capable of safeguarding all
forms of threats in the maritime domain.
Yet navies are generally ill-suited for many lower-end contingencies,
such as counter-IUU (illegal, unreported, and unregulated) missions.
The platforms, personnel, use of force doctrine, and basis in domestic
and international law of navies are sufficiently distinct from coast
guards as to be inappropriate to meet the wide array of law enforcement
duties required by modern maritime states.
Navy platforms and personnel are tailored for military campaigns and
equipped for high-kinetic environments not always appropriate for
civilian law enforcement patrols. To deploy a warship to arrest
fishermen, for example, may unnecessarily convey lethality and
intimidation. This dynamic is exacerbated when navies attempt to employ
firepower to disable non-compliant vessels leading to causalities, or
when navies stumble into crises involving civilian or government actors
in territorial disputes. Regardless of the domestic policing function of
the naval asset itself, both scenarios present the potentially
problematic optics of a warship employing lethal force against unarmed
or civilian actors.
Despite these factors, as we learned recently from the case of
Indonesia, the deterrent effect of navies combating illegal foreign
fishing activities continues to offer compelling rationale for
policymakers in the region to deploy navies on the front lines of
counter-IUU operations in disputed territory.
*** Lyle J. Morris is a Senior Project Associate at the RAND Corporation.
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